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Abstract
Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now possible to
generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. The collection and analysis of such data has
the potential to support various applications, including personalized medical services. While the
benefits of the genomics revolution are trumpeted by the biomedical community, the increased
availability of such data has major implications for personal privacy; notably because the genome
has certain essential features, which include (but are not limited to) (i) an association with traits
and certain diseases, (ii) identification capability (e.g., forensics), and (iii) revelation of family
relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the likelihood that genome
data will be made available in less regulated environments, such as the Internet and for-profit
companies. The problem of genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer
science, medicine, and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed data privacy
for various data types, there has been less attention dedicated to genomic data. Thus, the goal
of this paper is to provide a systematization of knowledge for the computer science community.
In doing so, we address some of the (sometimes erroneous) beliefs of this field and we report
on a survey we conducted about genome data privacy with biomedical specialists. Then, after
characterizing the genome privacy problem, we review the state-of-the-art regarding privacy
attacks on genomic data and strategies for mitigating such attacks, as well as contextualizing
these attacks from the perspective of medicine and public policy. This paper concludes with an
enumeration of the challenges for genome data privacy and presents a framework to systematize
the analysis of threats and the design of countermeasures as the field moves forward.
I Introduction
The genomic era began with the announcement twelve years ago that the Human Genome Project
(HGP) had completed its goals [Guttmacher and Collins, 2003]. The technology associated with
genome sequencing has progressed at a rapid pace, and this has coincided with the rise of cheap
computing and communication technologies. Consequentially, it is now possible to collect, store,
process, and share genomic data in a manner that was unthinkable at the advent of the HGP. In
parallel with this trend there has been significant progress on understanding and using genomic data
that fuels a rising hunger to broaden the number of individuals who make use of their genomes and
to support research to expand the ways in which genomes can be used. This rise in the availability
and use of genomic data has led to many concerns about its security and privacy. These concerns
have been addressed with efforts to provide technical protections and a corresponding series of
demonstrations of vulnerabilities. Given that much more research is needed and expected in this
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area, this seems like a good point to overview and systematize what has been done in the last decade
and provide ideas on a framework to aid future efforts.
To provide context, consider that it was not until the early 1990s when sequencing the human
genome was posited as a scientific endeavor. The first attempt for whole genome sequencing1 (a
laboratory process that maps the full DNA sequence of an individual’s genome) was initiated at the
U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1990 and the first full sequence was released 13 years
later at a total cost of $3 billion. Yet, sequencing technology has evolved and costs have plummeted,
such that the price for a whole genome sequence is $5K2 as of July 2014 and can be completed in
two to three days. The “$1K genome in 1 day” will soon be a reality.
Decreases in sequencing costs have coincided with an escalation in genomics as a research disci-
pline with explicit application possibilities. Genomic data is increasingly incorporated in a variety
of domains, including healthcare (e.g., personalized medicine), biomedical research (e.g., discovery
of novel genome-phenome associations), direct-to-consumer (DTC) services (e.g., disease risk tests),
and forensics (e.g., criminal investigations). For example, it is now possible for physicians to pre-
scribe the “right drug at the right time” (for certain drugs) according to the makeup of their patients’
genome [Bielinski et al., 2014; Overby et al., 2010; Gottesman et al., 2013a; Pulley et al., 2012].
To some people, genomic data is considered (and treated) no differently than traditional health
data (such as what might be recorded in one’s medical record) or any other type of data more
generally [Bains, 2010; Rothstein, 2005]. While genomic data may not be “exceptional” in its own
right, it has many features that distinguish it (discussed in depth in the following section) and there
is a common belief that it should be handled (e.g., stored, processed, and managed) with care. The
privacy issues associated with genomic data are complex, particularly because such data has a wide
range of uses and provides information on more than just the individual from which the data was
derived. Yet, perhaps most importantly, there is a great fear of the unknown. Every day, we learn
something new about the genome, whether it be knowledge of a new association with a particular
disease or proof against a previously reported association. We have yet to discover everything there
is from DNA, which makes it almost impossible to assign exact value, and thus manage DNA as
a personal asset (or public good). So, as the field of genomics evolves, so too will the views on
the privacy-sensitivity of genomic data. As this paper progresses, we review some of the common
beliefs revolving around genome privacy. And, in doing so, we report on the results of a survey we
conducted with biomedical specialists regarding their perspective on genome data privacy issues.
It should be recognized that there exist numerous publications on technical, ethical, and legal
aspects of genomics and privacy. The research in the field covers privacy-preserving handling of
genomic data in various environments (as will be reviewed in this paper). Yet, there are several
challenges to ensuring that genomics and privacy walk hand-in-hand. One of the challenges that
computer scientists face is that these views tend to be focused on one aspect of the problem in a cer-
tain setting with a certain discipline’s perspective. From the perspective of computer science, there
is a need for a complete framework which shows (i) what type of security and privacy requirements
are needed in each step of the handling of genomic data, (ii) a characterization of the various threat
models that are realized at each step, and (iii) open computational research problems. By providing
such a framework in this paper, we are able to illustrate the important problems of genome privacy
to computer science researchers working on security and privacy problems more generally.
Related Surveys and Articles. Privacy issues caused by forensic, medical, and other uses of
genomic data have been studied in the past few years [Stajano et al., 2008; Stajano, 2009; Malin,
2005a; Ayday et al., 2013a; Naveed, 2014; Cristofaro, 2014]. A recent survey [Erlich and Narayanan,
2013] discusses privacy breaches using genomic data and proposes methods for protection. It ad-
dresses topics that we discuss in Sections VI and Section IX of this paper. In Section IX we present
an end-to-end picture for the handling of genomic data in a variety of contexts as shown in Fig-
ure 9, while [Erlich and Narayanan, 2013] discusses how access control, data anonymization and
cryptographic techniques can be used to prevent genetic privacy breaches. Moreover, [Erlich and
1In this study, we refer to the process of obtaining the Whole Genome Sequence (WGS) or the Whole Exome Sequence
(WES) as sequencing and the process of obtaining the variants (usually only single nucleotide polymorphisms, or
SNPs) as genotyping.
2http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts/
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Narayanan, 2013] has been written for a general audience, whereas this paper is meant for computer
scientists (and in particular security and privacy specialists).
Contributions. Following are the main contributions of this paper:
• We provide an extensive and up-to-date (as of June 2015) literature survey3 of computer
science as well as medical literature about genome privacy.
• We report concerns expressed by an opportunistically ascertained group of biomedical special-
ists about the security and privacy of genomic data.
• We develop an end-to-end framework for the security and privacy of genomic data in a variety
of healthcare, biomedical research, legal and forensics, and direct-to-consumer contexts.
• We present what we believe to be the first document that reflects the opinions of computer
science, medical, and legal researchers for this important topic.
We also provide an online tutorial4 of biology and other related material to define technical terms
used in this (and other) paper(s) on the security and privacy of genomic data. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows. Section II explains to what extent genomic data is distinct from data
in general and health information in particular. Section III provides an overview of uses of genomic
data for the non-specialist. Section IV emphasizes the relevance of genome privacy. Section V reports
on the concerns of 61 opportunistically ascertained biomedical scientists regarding the importance
of genomic data privacy and security. Sections VI and VII provide literature surveys, where the
former summarizes the problem (i.e., the privacy risk) and the latter summarizes possible solutions.
Section VIII summarizes the challenges for genomic medicine and privacy. Based on this analysis,
Section IX offers a general framework for privacy-preserving handling of genomic data, including an
extensive threat model that discusses what type of attacks are possible at each step of the data flow.
II Special features of genomic data
In this section, we discuss why genomic data is special. We have identified six features of genomic
data, as shown in Figure 1, and while other data harbor some of these features, we are not aware of
any data (including other molecular, such as proteomics, data) that have all of these features.
Consider the following scenario. Alice decides to have her genome sequenced by a service called
MyGenome.com that keeps her data in a repository and gives Alice information about it over time.
At first she uses information from MyGenome to explore parts of her family tree and contribute her
genomic data, along with some facts about herself, to support medical research on diseases of her
choosing. Many years after MyGenome performed the initial sequencing, Alice began experiencing
health problems for which she visited a doctor who used her genomic data to help diagnose a likely
cause and customize a treatment based on variation in her genome sequence. Alice was impressed by
this experience and wondered what other conditions might be in her future. After some exploration
she discovered that evidence (based on published research papers) suggested a high risk of dementia
for people with her genomic profile. She worried that various parties, including MyGenome, the
genealogy service, and research studies with whom she shared her data, might share this and other
information in ways that she did not expect or intend and whether this might have undesired
consequences for her.
Alice’s story highlights several of the special features of genomic data. We depict six of them in
Figure 1, which we review for orientation of the reader.
How does the result of a DNA-based lab test differ from that of other tests? One notable feature
is how it is static and of long-lived value. Most tests, especially ones Alice could do for herself,
like taking her temperature and blood pressure, are of relatively short term value, whereas genomic
data changes little over a lifetime and may have value that lasts for decades. Of course, there are
3In this paper, the word “survey” is used to mean literature survey as well as opinion poll, however, the meaning will
be clear from the context.
4Available at https://sites.google.com/site/genoterms
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Figure 1: Properties of DNA that, in combination, may distinguish it from other data types.
Health/Behavior means that DNA contains information about an individual’s health and behavior.
Static(Traceable) means that DNA does not change much over time in an individual. Unique means that
the DNA of any two individuals can be easily distinguished from one another. Mystique refers to the public
perception of mystery about DNA. Value refers to the importance of information content in DNA and that
this importance does not decline with time (which is the case with other medical data e.g., blood pressure,
glucose level, or a blood test). In fact, this importance will likely increase with time. Kinship means that
DNA contains information about an individual blood relatives.
some exceptions to this longevity. For instance, sequencing techniques improve in accuracy over
time, so tests may be repeated to improve reliability. Additionally, there are some modifications in
DNA that accumulate over time (e.g., shortening of the ends of DNA strands due to aging [Harley
et al., 1990]). Most particularly, somatic mutations occur resulting in some degree of mosaicism in
every individual: the most striking examples are the deleterious modifications of the DNA observed
in cancer cells in comparison to DNA derived from normal cells. However, this long-lasting value
means that holding and using genomic data over extended periods of time, as Alice did, is likely.
Alice’s first use of her genomic data is expected to be a key driver for application development
in the future. While DNA has been used for some time in parentage tests, it can be generalized
from such studies to enable broader inference of kinship relations. Services such as Ancestry.com
and 23andme.com already offer kinship services based on DNA testing. While a substantial portion
of Alice’s DNA is in common with that of her relatives, it is also unique to her (unless she has an
identical twin). This has another set of implications about potential use of genomic data, like its
ability to link to her personally, a property that makes DNA testing useful in criminal forensics.
Another of the special features of DNA relates to its ability for diagnosing problems in health
and behavior. Tests are able to demonstrate increased likelihood for conditions such as macular
degeneration in old age and Alzheimer’s (the most common form of dementia) [Goldman et al.,
2011]. Although these are often probabilities, they can have diagnostic value as well as privacy
ramifications [Seddon et al., 2011]. For instance, if Alice’s relatives learned about her increased risk
of dementia, might they (consciously or unconsciously) trust her judgement a little less? Or might
they instead help her to get timely treatment? This power for good and bad has led genomic data
to have a certain “mystique”, which has been promoted by scientists and the media [Tambor et al.,
2002]. The “mystique” surrounding the genomic data is evident from movies and books on the topic.
Examples include the movie “GATTACA” and the book ”The DNA mystique” [Nelkin and Lindee,
1995].
Although there are many other types of tests (e.g., protein sequence tests) that carry key common
information with DNA tests, there is a special status that DNA data has come to occupy, a status
that some have phrased as “exceptional” [Bains, 2010]. These special fears about the sharing of
genomic data, whether founded or not, cannot be ignored when considering privacy implications.
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Hence, while DNA data may or may not be exceptional [Evans et al., 2010; Gostin and Hodge Jr,
1999], it is special in many ways, and hence warrants particular care.
III Uses of Genomic Data
An individual’s genomic sequence contains over 3 billion base pairs, which are distributed across
twenty-three chromosomes. Despite its size, it is estimated that the DNA of two individuals differ
by no more than 0.5% [Venter et al., 2001]; but it is these differences that influence an individual’s
health status and other aspects (as discussed in Section II). To provide further context for the
importance of genomic data, this section reviews several of the major applications in practice and
under development.
III.A Healthcare
First, it has been recognized that mutation in an individual’s genomic sequence can influence his
well being. In some cases, changes in a particular gene will have an adverse effect on a person’s
health immediately or at some point in the future [Botstein and Risch, 2003]. As of 2014, there
were over 1,600 of these traits reported on in the literature5, ranging from metabolic disorders (e.g.,
phenylketonuria, which is caused by a mutation in the PKU gene) to neurodegenerative diseases (e.g.,
Huntington’s disease, which is caused by a mutation in the HD gene [MacDonald et al., 1993]) to
blood disorders (e.g., Sickle cell anemia, caused by a mutation in the HBB gene [Saiki et al., 1985]).
While some of these diseases are manageable through changes in diet or pharmacological treatments,
others are not and have no known intervention to assist in the improvement of an individual’s health
status. Nonetheless, some individuals choose to learn their genetic status, so that they may order
their affairs accordingly and contribute to medical research [Mastromauro et al., 1987] (as elaborated
upon below). Moreover, genetic tests can be applied in a prenatal setting to detect a variety of factors
that can influence health outcomes (e.g., if a fetus is liable to have a congenital defect that could
limit its lifespan, such as Tay-Sach’s disease) [Lippman, 1991].
Yet, the majority of variations in an individual’s genome do not follow the monogenic model.
Rather, it has been shown that variation is associated with change in the susceptibility of an indi-
vidual to a certain disease or behavior [Botstein and Risch, 2003]. Cancer-predisposing variants in
genes such as BRCA1/2 or the Lynch Syndrome are well-known examples. Such variation may also
modify an individual’s ability to respond to a pharmaceutical agent. For instance, some individuals
are slow (fast) metabolizers, such that they may require a different amount of a drug than is standard
practice, or may gain the greatest benefit from a different drug entirely. This variation has been
leveraged to provide dosing for several medications in practice, including blood thinners after heart
surgery (to prevent clotting) and hypertension management (to lessen the severity of heart disease)
[Pulley et al., 2012]. Additionally, changes in an individual’s genome detected in a tumor cell can
inform which medications are most appropriate to treat cancer [Feero et al., 2011].
III.B Research
While the genome has been linked with a significant number of disorders and variable responses
to treatments, new associations are being discovered on a weekly basis. Technology for performing
such basic research continues to undergo rapid advances [Brunham and Hayden, 2012]. The dramatic
decrease in the cost of genome sequencing has made it increasingly possible to collect, store, and
computationally analyze sequenced genomic data on a fine-grained level, as well as over populations
on the order of millions of people (e.g., China’s Kadoorie biobank [Chen et al., 2011] and UK
Biobank [Allen et al., 2014] will each contain genomic data on 500,000 individuals by the end of
2014, while the U.S. National Cancer Institute is at the beginning of its Million Cancer Genome
Project [Haussler et al., 2012]). Yet, it should be recognized that computational analysis is separate
5http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Omim/mimstats.html
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from, and more costly than, sequencing technology itself (e.g., the $1K analysis of a genome is far
from being developed).
Moreover, technological advances in genome sequencing are coalescing with a big data revolution
in the healthcare domain. Large quantities of data derived from electronic health records (EHRs), for
instance, are being made available to support research on clinical phenotypes that, until several years
ago, were deemed to be too noisy and complex to model [Gottesman et al., 2013b]. As a consequence,
genome sequences have become critical components of the biomedical research process [Kohane,
2011].
III.C Direct-to-Consumer Services
Historically, genome sequencing was a complex and expensive process that, as a result, was left to
large research laboratories or diagnostic services, but in the past several years, there has been a rise
in DTC (Direct-to-consumer) genome sequencing from various companies [Prainsack and Vayena,
2013]. These services have made it affordable for individuals to become directly involved in the
collection, processing, and even analysis of their genomic data. The DTC movement has enabled
individuals to learn about their disease susceptibility risks (as alluded to earlier), and even perform
genetic compatibility tests with potential partners. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, DTC
has made it possible for individuals to be provided with digital representations of their genome
sequences, such that they can control how such information is disclosed, to whom, and when.
Of course, not all consumer products are oriented toward health applications. For example,
genomic data is increasingly applied to determine and/or track kinship. This information has been
applied for instance to track an individual’s ancestral heritage and determine the extent to which
individuals with the same surname are related with respect to their genomic variance [Jobling, 2001].
III.D Legal and Forensic
Given the static nature of genomic sequences, this information has often been used for investigative
purposes. For instance, this information may be applied in contested parentage suits [Anderlik, 2003].
Moreover, DNA found at a crime scene (or on a victim) may be used as evidence by law enforcement
to track down suspected criminals [Kaye and Smith, 2003]. It is not unheard of for residents of
a certain geographic region to be compelled to provide tissue samples to law enforcement to help
in such investigations [Greely et al., 2006]. Given the kinship relationships that such information
communicates, DNA from an unknown suspect has been compared to relatives to determine the
corresponding individual’s likely identity in order to better facilitate a manhunt.
One of the concerns of such uses, however, is that it is unclear how law enforcement may retain
and/or use this information in the future. The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that it is per-
missible for law enforcement to collect and retain DNA on suspects, even if the suspects are not
subsequently prosecuted [Maryland v. King, 2013]. Once DNA is shed by an individual (such as
from saliva left on a coffee cup in a restaurant) it has been held as an “abandoned” resource [Joh,
2006], such that the corresponding individual relinquishes rights of ownership. While the notion of
“abandoned DNA” remains a hotly contested issue, it is currently the case in the U.S. that DNA
collected from discarded materials can be sequenced and used by anyone without the consent of the
individual from which it was derived.
IV Relevance of Genome Privacy
As discussed in Section II, genomic data has numerous distinguishing features and applications.
As a consequence, the leakage of this information may have serious implications if misused, as in
genetic discrimination (e.g., for insurance, employment, or education) or blackmail [Gottlieb, 2001].
A true story exemplifying genetic discrimination was shared by Dr. Noralane Lindor at the Mayo
Clinic’s Individualizing Medicine Conference (2012) [Lindor, 2012]. During her study of a cancer
patient, Dr. Lindor also sequenced the grandchildren of her patient, two of whom turned out to have
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the mutation for the same type of cancer6. One of these grandchildren applied to the U.S. army
to become a helicopter pilot. Even though genetic testing is not a required procedure for military
recruitment, as soon as she revealed that she previously went through the aforementioned genetic
test, she was rejected for the position (in this case legislation does not apply to military recruitment,
as will be discussed below).
Ironically, the familial aspect of genomics complicates the problems revolving around privacy. A
recent example is the debate between the family members of Henrietta Lacks and the medical re-
searchers [Skloot, 2013]. Ms. Lacks (deceased in 1951) was diagnosed with cervical cancer and some
of her cancer cells were removed for medical research. These cells later paved the way to important
developments in medical treatment. Recently, researchers sequenced and published Ms. Lacks’s
genome without asking for the consent of her living family members. These relatives learned this
information from the author of the bestselling book “The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks” [Skloot
and Turpin, 2010], and they expressed the concern that the sequence contained information about
her family members. After complaints, the researchers took her genomic data down from public
databases. However, the privacy-sensitive genomic information of the members of the Lacks family
was already compromised because some of the data had already been downloaded and many inves-
tigators had previously published parts of the cells’ sequence. Although the NIH entered into an
agreement with the Lacks family to give them a voice in the use of these cells [Ritter, 2013], there
is no consensus about the scope of control that individuals and their families ought to have over the
downstream of their cells. Thousands of people, including James Watson [Nyholt et al., 2008], have
placed their genomic data on the Web without seeking permission of their relatives.
One of the often voiced concerns regarding genomic data is its potential for discrimination. While,
today, certain genome-disease and genome-trait associations are known, we do not know what will
be inferred from one’s genomic data in the future. In fact, a grandson of Henrietta Lacks expressed
his concern about the public availability of his grandmother’s genome by saying that “the main issue
was the privacy concern and what information in the future might be revealed”. Therefore, it is
likely that the privacy-sensitivity of genomic data, and thus the potential threats will increase over
time.
Threats emerging from genomic data are only possible via the leakage of such data, and, in
today’s healthcare system, there are several candidates for the source of this leakage. Genomic
data can be leaked through a reckless clinician, the IT of a hospital (e.g., through a breach of the
information security), or the sequencing facility. If the storage of such data is outsourced to a third
party, data can also be leaked from such a database through a hacker’s activity or a disgruntled
employee. Similarly, if the genomic data is stored by the individual himself (e.g., on his smartphone),
it can be leaked due to a malware. Furthermore, surprisingly, sometimes the leakage is performed
by the genome owner. For example, on a genome-sharing website, openSNP7 [Greshake et al., 2014],
people upload the variants in their genomes – sometimes with their identifying material, including
their real names.
One way of protecting the privacy of individuals’ genomic data is through the law or policy. In
2007, the U.S. adopted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which prohibits
certain types of discrimination in access to health insurance and employment. Similarly, the U.S.
Presidential report on genome privacy [Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues,
2012] discusses policies and techniques to protect the privacy of genomic data. In 2008, the Council of
Europe adopted the convention concerning genetic testing for health purposes [Council of Europe,
2008]. There are, in fact, hundreds of legal systems in the world, ranging in scope from federal
to state / province, and municipality level and each can adopt different definitions, rights, and
responsibilities for an individual’s privacy. Yet, while such legislation may be put into practice, it
is challenging to enforce because the uses of data cannot always be detected. Additionally, legal
regimes may be constructed such that they are subject to interpretation or leave loopholes in place.
For example, GINA does not apply to life insurance or the military [Altman and Klein, 2002].
Therefore, legislation alone, while critical in shaping the norms of society, is insufficient to prevent
privacy violations.
6Having a genetic mutation for a cancer only probabilistically increases the predisposition to the cancer.
7Hosted at http://www.openSNP.org
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The idea of using technical solutions to guarantee the privacy of such sensitive and valuable
data brings about interesting debates. On one hand, the potential importance of genomic data
for mankind is tremendous. Yet, privacy-enhancing technologies may be considered as an obstacle
to achieving these goals. Technological solutions for genome privacy can be achieved by various
techniques, such as cryptography or obfuscation (proposed solutions are discussed in detail in Sec-
tion VII). Yet, cryptographic techniques typically reduce the efficiency of the algorithms, introducing
more computational overload, while preventing the users of such data from “viewing” the data. And,
obfuscation-based methods reduce the accuracy (or utility) of genomic data. Therefore, especially
when human life is at stake, the applicability of such privacy-enhancing techniques for genomic data
is questionable.
On the other hand, to expedite advances in personalized medicine, genome-phenome association
studies often require the participation of a large number of research participants. To encourage
individuals to enroll in such studies, it is crucial to adhere to ethical principles, such as autonomy,
reciprocity and trust more generally (e.g., guarantee that genomic data will not be misused). Con-
sidering today’s legal systems, the most reliable way to provide such trust pledges may be to use
privacy-enhancing technologies for the management of genomic data. It would severely discredit a
medical institution’s reputation if it failed to fulfill the trust requirements for the participants of a
medical study. More importantly, a violation of trust could slow down genomic research (e.g., by
causing individuals to think twice before they participate in a medical study) possibly more than the
overload introduced due to privacy-enhancing technologies. Similarly, in law enforcement, genomic
data (now being used in FBI’s Combined DNA Index System – CODIS) should be managed in a
privacy-preserving way to avoid potential future problems (e.g., mistrials, law suits).
In short, we need techniques that will guarantee the security and privacy of genomic data,
without significantly degrading the efficiency of the use of genomic data in research and healthcare.
Obviously, achieving all of the aforementioned properties would require some compromise. Our
preliminary assessment of expert opinion (discussed in Section V) begins to investigate what tradeoffs
users of such data would consider appropriate.
V Genomics/Genetics Expert Opinion
V.A Objective
We explored the views of an opportunistically ascertained group of biomedical researchers in order
to probe levels of concern about privacy and security to be addressed in formulating guidelines and
in future research.
V.B Survey Design
The field of genomics is relatively young, and its privacy implications are still being refined. Based
on informal discussions (primarily with computer scientists) and our review of the literature, we
designed a survey to learn more about biomedical researchers’ level of concern about genomics and
privacy. Specifically, the survey inquired about (i) widely held assertions about genome privacy,
(ii) ongoing and existing research directions on genome privacy, and (iii) sharing of an individual’s
genomic data, using the following probes in Figure 2. The full survey instrument is available at
http://goo.gl/forms/jwiyx2hqol. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign granted an exemption for the survey . Several prior surveys focused on genome
privacy have been conducted and have focused on the perspectives of the general public [Kaufman
et al., 2009, 2012; Platt et al., 2013; De Cristofaro, 2014] and geneticists [Pulley et al., 2008]. Our
survey is different because it investigates the opinion of biomedical researchers with respect to the
intention of data protection by technical means.
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The eight probes used to explore opinions about genome privacy follows:
1. Genome privacy is hopeless, because all of us leave biological cells (hair, skin, droplets of saliva,...)
wherever we go.
2. Genomic data is not special and should be treated as any other sensitive health data e.g. health
record or mental health notes.
3. Genome privacy is irrelevant, because genetics is non-deterministic
4. Genome privacy should be left to bioinformaticians, they can provide better privacy solutions
than computer security, privacy and cryptography community can.
5. Genome privacy will be fully guaranteed by legislation
6. Privacy Enhancing Technologies are a nuisance in the case of genetics: genetic data should be
made available online to everyone to facilitate research, as done e.g. in the case of the Personal
Genome Project
7. Encrypting genomic data is superfluous because it is hard to identify a person from her variants
8. Advantages of genomic based healthcare justify the harm that genome privacy breach can cause.
Figure 2: Probes of attitudes
18% 39%
20%
39%
44%
3%
36%
Security/Privacy
Genomics/Genetics
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
No familiarity Some familiarity Knowledgeable Expert
Figure 3: Self-identified expertise of the survey respondents
V.C Data Collection Methodology
We conducted our survey both online and by paper. Snowball sampling [Goodman, 1961] was used to
recruit subjects for the online survey. This approach enables us to get more responses, but the frame
is unknown and thus response rate cannot be reported. A URL for the online survey was sent to
the people working in genomics/genetics area (i.e., molecular biology professors, bioinformaticians,
physicians, genomics/genetics researchers) known to the authors of this paper. Recipients were
asked to forward it to other biomedical experts they know. Email and Facebook private messages
(as an easy alternative for email) were used to conduct the survey. Eight surveys were collected by
handing out paper copies to participants of a genomics medicine conference. Overall the survey was
administered to 61 individuals.
V.D Potential Biases.
We designed the survey to begin to explore the extent to which biomedical researchers share concerns
expressed by some computer scientists. While not generalizable to all biomedical experts due to the
method for recruiting participants, their responses do provide preliminary insights into areas of
concern about privacy and security expressed by biomedical experts. More research is needed to
assess the representativeness of these views.
V.E Findings
Approximately half of the participants were from the U.S. and slightly less than half from Europe (the
rest selected “other”). The participants were also asked to report their expertise in genomics/genetics
and security/privacy. We show these results in Figure 3.
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We asked whether the subjects agree with the statements listed in Figure 2 above. Figure 4
shows the results. 20% of the respondents believe that protecting genome privacy is impossible as
an individual genomic data can be obtained from his leftover cells (Probe 1). Almost half of the
respondents consider genomic data to be no different than other health data (Probe 2). Even though
genomic information is, in most instances, non-deterministic, all respondents believe that this fact
does not reduce the importance of genome privacy (Probe 3). Only 7% of our respondents think that
protecting genome privacy should be left to bioinformaticians (Probe 4). Furthermore, 20% of the
respondents believe that genome privacy can be fully guaranteed by legislation (Probe 5). Notably,
only 7% of the respondents think that privacy enhancing technologies are a nuisance in the case of
genetics (Probe 6). According to only about 10% of the respondents, the confidentiality of genomic
data is superfluous because it is hard to identify a person from her variants (Probe 7). And, finally,
about 30% of the respondents think that advantages that will be brought by genomics in healthcare
will justify the harm that might be caused by privacy issues (Probe 8).
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Figure 4: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes
are described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the probes.
We asked participants whether they would share their genomes on the Web (Figure 5). 48% of
the respondents are not in favor of doing so, while 30% would reveal their genome anonymously, and
8% would reveal their identities alongside their genome. We also asked respondents how they think
about the scope of the individual’s right to share one’s genomic data given that the data contain
information about the individual’s blood relatives. Figure 6 shows that only 18% of the respondents
think that one should not be allowed to share, 43% of the respondents think that one should be
allowed to share only for medical purpose, and 39% of the respondents think that one should have
the right to share her genomic data publicly.
As discussed in Section IV, there is a tension between the desire for genome privacy and biomed-
ical research. Thus, we asked the survey participants what they would trade for privacy. The results
(shown in Figure 7) indicate that the respondents are willing to trade money and test time (dura-
tion) to protect privacy, but they usually do not accept trading accuracy or utility.
We also asked the respondents to evaluate the importance of existing and ongoing research
directions on genome privacy (as discussed in detail in Section VII), considering the types of problems
they are trying to solve (Figure 8). The majority of respondents think that genomics privacy is
48% 15% 30% 8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
No May be Yes (anonymously) Yes (along with my name and/or picture)
Figure 5: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web?
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No Yes (only with his or her doctors for clinical purposes) Yes (including sharing it publicly)
Figure 6: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data?
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Figure 7: Response to the question: What can we compromise to improve privacy of genomic data?
(Multiple options can be checked)
important.
V.F Discussion
Our results show that these biomedical researchers believe that genomic privacy is important and
needs special attention. Figure 4 shows that, except for Probes 2 and 8, 80% of the biomedical
experts do not endorse the statements listed in Figure 2. Approximately three-quarters of the
biomedical experts believe that advantages of genome-based healthcare do not justify the harm that
can be caused by the genome privacy breach. Probe 2 is an interesting result in that about half of
the biomedical experts believe that genomic data should be treated as any other sensitive health
data. This seems reasonable because, at the moment, health data can, in many instances, be more
sensitive than genomic data. The biomedical community also agrees on the importance of current
genome privacy research. Figure 8 shows that these biomedical researchers ranks the placement of
genomic data to the cloud as their prime concern. Moreover, they agree with the importance of
other genome privacy research topics shown in Figure 8.
We provide additional results stratified according to the expertise of the participants in the
appendix.
VI Known Privacy Risks
In this section, we survey a wide spectrum of privacy threats to human genomic data, as reported
by prior research.
VI.A Re-identification Threats
Re-identification is probably the most extensively studied privacy risk in dissemination and analysis
of human genomic data. In such an attack, an unauthorized party looks at the published human
genomes that are already under certain protection to hide the identity information of their donors
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Figure 8: Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community.
(e.g., patients), and tries to recover the identities of the individuals involved. Such an attack, once
it succeeds, can cause serious damage to those donors, e.g., discrimination and financial loss. In this
section, we review the weaknesses within existing privacy protection techniques that make this type
of attack possible.
Pseudo-anonymized Data. A widely used method for protecting health information is the
removal of explicit and quasi-identifying attributes (e.g., name and date of birth). Such redaction
meets legal requirements to protect privacy (e.g., de-identification under the U.S. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act) for traditional health records. However, genomic data cannot be
anonymized by just removing the identifying information. There is always a risk for the adversary
to infer the phenotype of a DNA-material donor (that is, the person’s observable characteristics
like eye/hair/skin colors), which will lead to her identification, from her genotypes (her genetic
makeup). Even though the techniques for this purpose are still rudimentary, the rapid progress in
genomic research and technologies is quickly moving us toward that end. Moreover, re-identification
can be achieved through inspecting the background information that comes with publicized DNA
sequences [Gitschier, 2009; Gymrek et al., 2013; Hayden, 2013]. As an example, genomic variants on
the Y chromosome have been correlated with surnames (for males), which can be found out using
public geneology databases. Other instances include identifying Personal Genome Project (PGP)
participants through public demographic data [Sweeney et al., 2013], recovering the identities of
family members from the data released by the 1000 Genome Project using public information (e.g.
death notices) [Malin, 2006], and other correlation attacks [Malin and Sweeney, 2004]. It has been
shown that even cryptographically secure protocols leaks a lot of information when used for genomic
data [Goodrich, 2009].
Attacks on Machine Learning Models. Most attacks on genomic data use the entire dataset for
the attack. Recently, [Fredrikson et al., 2014] showed that even the machine learning models trained
on the genomic data can reveal information about the people whose data was used for training the
model as well as any arbitrary person given some background information.
VI.B Phenotype Inference
Another critical privacy threat to human genome data is inference of sensitive phenotype information
from the DNA sequence. Here we summarize related prior studies.
Aggregate Genomic Data. In addition to the aforementioned re-identification threats (discussed
in Section VI.A, which comes from the possible correlation between an individual’s genomic data
and other public information, the identity of a participant of a genomic study can also be revealed
by a “second sample”, that is, part of the DNA information from the individual. This happens,
for example, when one obtains a small amount of genomic data from another individual, such as a
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small set of her single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and attempts to determine her presence in a
clinical study on HIV (a phenotype), based on anonymized patient DNA data published online. This
turns out to be rather straightforward, given the uniqueness of individual’s genome. Particularly,
in 2004, research shows that as few as 75 independent SNPs are enough to uniquely distinguish one
individual from others [Lin et al., 2004]. Based on this observation, the genomic researchers generally
agree that such DNA raw data are too sensitive to release through online repositories (such as the
NIH’s PopSet resources), without proper agreements in place. An alternative is to publish “pooled”
data, in which summary statistics are disclosed for the case and control groups of individuals in a
study.
Yet, [Homer et al., 2008] showed that when an adversary had access to a known participant’s
genome sequence, they could determine if the participant was in a certain group. Specifically, the
researchers compared one individual’s DNA sample to the rates at which her variants show up in
various study populations (and a reference population that does not include the individual) and
applied a statistical hypothesis test to determine the likelihood of which group she is in (i.e., case
or reference). The findings of the work led the NIH, as well as the Wellcome Trust in the UK, to
remove all publicly available aggregate genomic data from their websites. Ever since, researchers are
required to sign a data use agreement (prohibiting re-identification) to access such data [Zerhouni
and Nabel, 2008], the process of which could take several months. At the same time, such attacks
were enhanced. First, Homer’s test statistic was improved through exploitation of genotype frequen-
cies [Jacobs et al., 2009], while an alternative, based on linear regression was developed to facilitate
more robust inference attacks [Masca et al., 2011]. Wang et. al. [Wang et al., 2009a] demonstrated,
perhaps, an even more powerful attack by showing that an individual can be identified even from
the aggregate statistical data (linkage disequilibrium measures) published in research papers. While
the methodology introduced in [Homer et al., 2008] requires on the order of 10,000 genetic variations
(of the target individual), this new attack requires only on the order of 200. Their approach even
shows the possibility of recovering part of the DNA raw sequences for the participants of biomedical
studies, using the statistics including p-values and coefficient of determination (r2) values.
Quantification of information content in aggregate statistics obtained as an output of genome-
wide association studies (GWAS) shows that an individual’s participation in the study and her
phenotype can be inferred with high accuracy [Im et al., 2012; Craig et al., 2011]. Beyond these
works, it has been shown that a Bayesian network could be leveraged to incorporate additional
background information, and thus improve predictive power [Clayton, 2010]. It was recently shown
that RNA expression data can be linked to the identity of an individual through the inference of
SNPs [Schadt et al., 2012].
Yet, there is debate over the practicality of such attacks. Some researchers believe that individual
identification from pooled data is hard in practice [Braun et al., 2009; Sankararaman et al., 2009;
Visscher and Hill, 2009; Gilbert, 2008]. In particular, it has been shown that the assumptions
required to accurately identify individuals from aggregate genomic data rarely hold in practice [Braun
et al., 2009]. Such inference attacks depend upon the ancestry of the participants, the absolute and
relative number of people in case and control groups, and the number of SNPs [Masca et al., 2011]
and the availability of the second sample. Thus, the false positive rates are much higher in practice.
Still, others believe that publication of complete genome wide aggregate results are dangerous for
privacy of the participants [Lumley and Rice, 2010; Church et al., 2009]. Furthermore, the NIH
continues to adhere to its policy of data use agreements.
Beyond the sharing of aggregate data, it should be recognized that millions of people are se-
quenced or genotyped for the state-of-the-art GWAS studies. This sequenced data is shared among
different institutions with inconsistent security and privacy procedures [Brenner, 2013]. On the one
hand, this could lead to serious backlash and fear to participate in such studies. On the other hand,
not sharing this data could severely impede biomedical research. Thus, measures should be taken
to mitigate the negative outcomes of genomic data sharing [Brenner, 2013].
Correlation of Genomic Data. Partially available genomic data can be used to infer the un-
published genomic data due to linkage disequilibrium (LD), a correlation between regions of the
genome [Halperin and Stephan, 2009; Marchini and Howie, 2010]. For example, Jim Watson (the
discoverer of DNA) donated his genome for research but concealed his ApoE gene, because it reveals
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susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease. Yet, it was shown that the ApoE gene variant can be inferred
from the published genome [Nyholt et al., 2008]. Such completion attacks are quite relevant in DTC
environments, where customers have the option to hide some of the variants related to a particular
disease.
While all the prior genomic privacy attacks exploit low-order SNP correlations, [Samani et al.,
2015] show that high-order SNP correlations result in far more powerful attacks.
[Wagner, 2015] investigates 22 different privacy metrics to study which metrics are more mean-
ingful to quantify the loss of genomic privacy due to correlation of genomic data.
Kin Privacy Breach. A significant part of the population does not want to publicly release their
genomic data [McGuire et al., 2011]. Disclosures of their relatives can thus threaten the privacy of
such people, who never release their genomic data. The haplotypes of the individuals not sequenced
or genotyped can be obtained using LD-based completion attacks [Kong et al., 2008]. For instance, if
both parents are genotyped, then most of the variants for their offspring can be inferred. The genomic
data of family members can also be inferred using data that has been publicly shared by blood
relatives and domain-specific knowledge about genomics [Humbert et al., 2013]. Such reconstruction
attacks can be carried out using (i) (partial) genomic data of a subset of family members, and (ii)
publicly-known genomic background information (linkage disequilibrium and minor allele frequencies
(MAFs). This attack affects individuals whose relatives publicly share genomic data (obtained using
DTC services) on the Internet (e.g. on openSNP [Greshake et al., 2014]). The family members of
the individuals who publish their genomic data on openSNP can be found on social media sites, such
as Facebook [Humbert et al., 2013].
Note that “correlation of genomic data” and “kin privacy breach” attacks are based on different
structural aspects of genomic data. While correlation attacks are based on the linkage disequilibrium
(LD), which is a genetic variation within an individual’s genome. A kin privacy breach is caused by
genomic correlations among individuals. Moreover, a kin privacy breach can also be realized through
phenotype information alone. For instance, a parent’s skin color or height can be used to predict
their child’s skin color or height.
VI.C Other Threats
In addition to the above threats, there are a few other genome-related privacy issues. We describe
them below:
Anonymous Paternity Breach. As mentioned above, the Y chromosome is inherited from father
to son virtually intact and genealogy databases link this chromosome to the surname to model
ancestry. Beyond the case discussed above, this information has been used to identify sperm donors
in several cases. For example, a 15 year boy who was conceived using donor sperm, successfully
found his biological father by sending his cheek swab to a genealogy service and doing Internet
search [Motluk, 2005; Stein, 2005]. Similarly, an adopted child was able to find his real father
with the help of a genealogy database (and substantial manual effort) [Naik, 2009]. In short, DNA
testing has made tracing anonymous sperm donors easy and theoretically sperm donors can no more
be anonymous [Lehmann-Haupt, 2010].
Legal and Forensic. DNA is collected for legal and forensic purposes from criminals8 and vic-
tims9. On the one hand, forensic techniques are becoming more promising with the evolving tech-
nology [Kayser and de Knijff, 2011; Pakstis et al., 2010]. On the other hand, abuse of DNA (e.g., to
stage crime scenes) have already baffled people and law enforcement agencies [Bobellan, 2010]. Some
people like Madonna (the singer) are paranoid enough about the misuse of their DNA that they hire
DNA sterilization teams to clean up their leftover DNA (e.g., stray hairs or saliva) [Villalva, 2012].
We are not aware of any privacy risk assessment studies done primarily in legal and forensic context,
in part because law enforcement agencies store a very limited amount of genetic markers. Yet, in
the future, it could well happen that law enforcement agencies will have access to the database of
8http://www.justice.gov/ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes
9http://www.rainn.org/get-information/sexual-assault-recovery/rape-kit
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whole genome sequences. We discussed sperm donor paternity breach above which is also relevant
in legal context.
VII State-of-the-art Solutions
In this section, we provide an overview of technical approaches to address various privacy and security
issues related to genomic data. Despite the risks associated with genomic data, we can find ways
to mitigate them to move forward [Altman et al., 2013]. Some solutions are efficient enough for
practical use, while others need further improvement to become practical. In particular, practical
solutions often exploit the special nature of the genomic data to find ways to be efficient under
relevant domain assumptions.
VII.A Healthcare
Personalized medicine. Personalized medicine promises to revolutionize healthcare through
treatments tailored to an individual’s genomic makeup and genome-based disease risk tests that can
enable early diagnosis of serious diseases. Various players have different concerns here. Patients, for
instance, are concerned about the privacy of their genomes. Healthcare organizations are concerned
about their reputation and the trust of their clients. And for-profit companies, such as pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers, are concerned about the secrecy of their disease markers (proprietary information
of business importance).
A disease risk test can be expressed as a regular expression query taking into account sequencing
errors and other properties of sequenced genomic data. Oblivious automata enable regular expression
queries to be computed over genome sequence data while preserving the privacy of both the queries
and the genomic data [Troncoso-Pastoriza et al., 2007; Frikken, 2009]. Cryptographic schemes have
been developed to delegate the intensive computation in such a scheme to a public cloud in a
privacy-preserving fashion [Blanton et al., 2012].
Alternatively, it has been shown that a cryptographic primitive called Authorized Private Set
Intersection (A-PSI) can be used in this setting [Baldi et al., 2011; Cristofaro et al., 2012]. In person-
alized medicine protocols based on A-PSI, the healthcare organization provides cryptographically-
authorized disease markers, while the patient supplies her genome. In this setting, a regulatory
authority, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), can also certify the disease mark-
ers before they can be used in a clinical setting. Despite its potential, this protocol has certain
limitations. First, it is not very efficient in terms of its communication and computation costs.
Second, the model assumes that patients store their own genomes, which is not necessarily the case
in practice.
To address the latter issue, it has been suggested that the storage of the homomorphically
encrypted variants (e.g., SNPs) can be delegated to a semi-honest third party [Ayday et al., 2013c].
A healthcare organization can then request the third party to compute a disease susceptibility test
(weighted average of the risk associated with each variant) on the encrypted variants using an
interactive protocol involving (i) the patient, (ii) the healthcare organization and (iii) the third
party. Additive homomorphic encryption enables a party with the public key to add ciphertexts
or multiply a plaintext constant to a ciphertext. Additive homomorphic encryption based methods
can also be used to conduct privacy-preserving computation of disease risk based on both genomic
and non-genomic data (e.g., environmental and/or clinical data) [Ayday et al., 2013d]. One of
the problems with such protocols, however, is that storage of homomorphically encrypted variants
require orders of magnitude more memory than plaintext variants. However, a trade-off between
the storage cost and level of privacy can be composed [Ayday et al., 2013b]. A second problem is
that when an adversary has knowledge of the LD between the genome regions and the nature of the
test, the privacy of the patients will decrease when tests are conducted on their homomorphically
encrypted variants. This loss of privacy can be quantified using an entropy-based metric [Ayday
et al., 2013e]. [Danezis and De Cristofaro, 2014] propose two cryptographic protocols using framework
proposed by [Ayday et al., 2013e]. The first protocol involves a patient and a medical center (MC).
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MC encrypts the (secret) weights, sends them to the patient’s smartcard, and operations are done
inside the smartcard. This protocol also hides which and how many SNPs are tested. Second
protocol is based on secret sharing in which the (secret) weights of a test is shared between the
SPU and the MC. This protocol still relies on a smartcard (held by the patient) to finalize the
computation. [Djatmiko et al., 2014] propose a secure evaluation algorithm to compute genomic
tests that are based on a linear combination of genome data values. In their setting, a medical
center prescribes a test and the client (patient) accesses a server via his mobile device to perform
the test. The main goals are to (i) keep the coefficients of the test (secret weights) secret from
the client, (ii) keep selection of the SNPs confidential from the client, and (iii) keep SNPs of the
client confidential from the server (server securely selects data from the client). They achieve these
goals by using a combination of additive homomorphic encryption (Paillier’s scheme) and private
information retrieval. Test calculations are performed on the client’s mobile device and the medical
server can also perform some related computations. Eventually, client gets the result and shows
it to his physician. As a case study, the authors implemented the Warfarin dosing algorithm as a
representative example. They also implemented a prototype system in an Android App. In [Karvelas
et al., 2014], authors propose a technique to store genomic data in encrypted form, use an Oblivious
RAM to access the desired data without leaking the access pattern, and finally run secure two-party
computation protocol to privately compute the required function on the retrieved encrypted genomic
data. The proposed construction includes two separate servers: cloud and proxy.
Functional encryption allows a user to compute on encrypted data and learn the result in plaintext
in a non-interactive fashion. However, currently functional encryption is very inefficient. [Naveed
et al., 2014] propose a new cryptographic model called “Controlled Functional Encryption (C-FE)”
that allows construction of realistic and efficient schemes. The authors propose two C-FE construc-
tions: one for inner-product functionality and other for any polynomial-time computable functional-
ity. The former is based on a careful combination of CCA2 secure public-key encryption with secret
sharing, while the later is based on a careful combination of CCA2 secure public-key encryption
with Yao’s garbled circuit. C-FE constructions are based on efficient cryptographic primitives and
perform very well in practical applications. The authors evaluated C-FE constructions on person-
alized medicine, genomic patient similarity, and paternity test applications and showed that C-FE
provides much better security and efficiency than prior work.
Raw aligned genomic data. Raw aligned genomic data, that is, the aligned outputs of a
DNA sequencer, are often used by geneticists in the research process. Due to the limitations of
current sequencing technology, it is often the case that only a small number of nucleotides are read
(from the sequencer) at a time. A very large number of these short reads10, covering the entire
genome are obtained, and are subsequently aligned, using a reference genome. The position of
the read relative to the reference genome is determined by finding the approximate match on the
reference genome. With today’s sequencing techniques, the size of such data can be up to 300GB per
individual (in the clear), which makes public key cryptography impractical for the management of
such data. Symmetric stream cipher and order-preserving encryption [Agrawal et al., 2004] provide
more efficient solutions for storing, retrieving, and processing this large amount of data in a privacy-
preserving way [Ayday et al., 2014]. Order-preserving encryption keeps the ordering information in
the ciphertexts to enable range queries on the encrypted data. We emphasize that order-preserving
encryption may not be secure for most practical applications.
Genetic compatibility testing. Genetic compatibility testing is of interest in both healthcare
and DTC settings. It enables a pair of individuals to evaluate the risk of conceiving an unhealthy
baby. In this setting, PSI can be used to compute genetic compatibility, where one party submits
the fingerprint for his or her genome-based diseases, while the other party submits her or his entire
genome. In doing so, the couple learns their genetic compatibility without revealing their entire
genomes [Baldi et al., 2011]. This protocol leaks information about an individual’s disease risk
status to the other party and its requirements for computation and communication may make it
impractical.
10A short read corresponds to a sequence of nucleotides within a DNA molecule. The raw genomic data of an
individual consists of hundreds of millions of short reads. Each read typically consists of 100 nucleotides.
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Pseudo-anyonymization. Pseudo-anonymization is often performed by the healthcare organiza-
tion that collects the specimen (possibly by pathologists) to remove patient identifiers before sending
the specimen to a sequencing laboratory. In lieu of such information, a pseudonym can be derived
from the genome itself and public randomness, independently at the healthcare organization and
sequence laboratory for symmetric encryption [Cassa et al., 2013]. This process can mitigate sample
mismatch at the sequencing lab. However, since the key is derived from the data that is encrypted
using the same key, symmetric encryption should guarantee circular security (security notion re-
quired when cipher is used to encrypt its own key), an issue which is not addressed in the published
protocol.
Confidentiality against Brute-force Attacks. History has shown that encryption schemes have
limited lifetime before they are broken. Genomic data, however, has lifetime much longer than that
of a state-of-the-art encryption schemes. A brute-force attack works by decrypting the ciphertext
with all possible keys. Honey encryption [Juels and Ristenpart, 2014] guarantees that a ciphertext
decrypted with an incorrect key (as guessed by an adversary) results in a plausible-looking yet
incorrect plaintext. Therefore, HE gives encrypted data an additional layer of protection by serving
up fake data in response to every incorrect guess of a cryptographic key or password. However,
HE relies on a highly accurate distribution-transforming encoder (DTE) over the message space.
Unfortunately, this requirement jeopardizes the practicality of HE. To use HE the message space
needs to be understood quantitatively, that is, the precise probability of every possible message needs
to be understood. When messages are not uniformly distributed, characterizing and quantifying
the distribution is non-trivial. Building an efficient and precise DTE is the main challenge when
extending HE to a real use case; [Huang et al., 2015] have designed such a DTE for genomic data.
We note that HE scheme for genomic data is not specific to healthcare and is relevant for any use
of genomic data.
VII.B Research
Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS). Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS),
11 are conducted by analyzing the statistical correlation between the variants of a case group (i.e.,
phenotype positive) and a control group (i.e., phenotype negative). GWAS is one of the most common
types of studies performed to learn genome-phenome associations. In GWAS the aggregate statistics
(e.g., p-values) are published in scientific articles and are made available to other researchers. As
mentioned earlier, such statistics can pose privacy threats as explained in Section VI.
Recently, it has been suggested that such information can be protected through the application of
noise to the data. In particular, differential privacy, a well-known technique for answering statistical
queries in a privacy preserving manner [Dwork, 2006], was recently adapted to compose privacy
preserving query mechanisms for GWAS settings [Fienberg et al., 2011; Johnson and Shmatikov,
2013]. A mechanism K gives -differential privacy if for all databases D and D′ differing on at most
one record, the probability of K(D) is less than or equal to the probability of exp() ×K(D′). In
simple words, if we compute a function on a database with and without a single individual and
the answer in both cases is approximately the same, then we say that the function is differentially
private. Essentially, if the answer does not change when an individual is or is not in the database, the
answer does not compromise the privacy of that individual. [Fienberg et al., 2011] propose methods
for releasing differentially private minor allele frequencies (MAFs), chi-square statistics, p-values, the
top-k most relevant SNPs to a specific phenotype, and specific correlations between particular pairs of
SNPs. These methods are notable because traditional differential privacy techniques are unsuitable
for GWAS due to the fact that the number of correlations studied in GWAS is much larger than the
number of people in the study. However, differential privacy is typically based on a mechanism that
adds noise (e.g., by using Laplacian noise, geometric noise, or exponential mechanism), and thus
requires a very large number of research participants to guarantee acceptable levels of privacy and
utility. [Yu et al., 2014] have extended the work of [Fienberg et al., 2011] to compute differentially
private chi-square statistics for arbitrary number of cases and controls. [Johnson and Shmatikov,
11http://www.genome.gov/20019523
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2013] explain that computing the number of relevant SNPs and the pairs of correlated SNPs are the
goals of a typical GWAS and are not known in advance. They provide a new exponential mechanism
– called a distance-score mechanism – to add noise to the output. All relevant queries required by
a typical GWAS are supported, including the number of SNPs associated with a disease and the
locations of the most significant SNPs. Their empirical analysis suggests that the new approach
produces acceptable privacy and utility for a typical GWAS.
A meta-analysis of summary statistics from multiple independent cohorts is required to find
associations in a GWAS. Different teams of researchers often conduct studies on different cohorts
and are limited in their ability to share individual-level data due to Institutional Review Board
(IRB) restrictions. However, it is possible for the same participant to be in multiple studies, which
can affect the results of a meta-analysis. It has been suggested that one-way cryptographic hashing
can be used to identify overlapping participants without sharing individual-level data [Turchin and
Hirschhorn, 2012].
[Xie et al., 2014] proposed a cryptographic approach for privacy preserving genome-phenome
studies. This approach enables privacy preserving computation of genome-phenome associations
when the data is distributed among multiple sites.
Sequence comparison. Sequence comparison is widely used in bioinformatics (e.g., in gene find-
ing, motif finding, and sequence alignment). Such comparison is computationally complex. Cryp-
tographic tools such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and secure multiparty computation
(SMC) can be used for privacy-preserving sequence comparison. Fully homomorphic encryption
enables any party with the public key to compute any arbitrary function on the ciphertext without
ever decrypting it. Multiparty computation enables a group of parties to compute a function of their
inputs without revealing anything other than the output of the function to each other. It has been
shown that fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), secure multiparty computation (SMC), and other
traditional cryptographic tools [Atallah et al., 2003; Jha et al., 2008] can be applied for comparison
purposes, but they do not scale to a full human genome. Alternatively, more scalable provably
secure protocols exploiting public clouds have been proposed [Blanton et al., 2012; Atallah and Li,
2005]. Computation on the public data can be outsourced to a third party environment (e.g., cloud
provider) while computation on sensitive private sections can be performed locally; thus, outsourc-
ing most of the computationally intensive work to the third party. This computation partitioning
can be achieved using program specialization which enables concrete execution on public data and
symbolic execution on the sensitive data [Wang et al., 2009b]. This protocol takes advantage of the
fact that genomic computations can be partitioned into computation on public data and private
data, exploiting the fact that 99.5% of the genomes of any two individuals are similar.
Moreover, genome sequences can be transformed into sets of offsets of different nucleotides in the
sequence to efficiently compute similarity scores (e.g., Smith-Waterman computations) on outsourced
distributed platforms (e.g., volunteer systems). Similar sequences have similar offsets, which provides
sufficient accuracy, and many-to-one transformations provide privacy [Szajda et al., 2006]. Although
this approach does not provide provable security, it does not leak significant useful information about
the original sequences.
Until this point, all sequence comparison methods we have discussed work on complete genomic
sequences. Compressed DNA data (i.e., the variants) can be compared using novel data structure
called Privacy-Enhanced Invertible Bloom Filter [Eppstein et al., 2011]. This method provides
communication-efficient comparison schemes.
Person-level genome sequence records. Person-level genome sequence records contrast with
the previous methods which obscure sequences and report on aggregated data rather than that of a
single person. Several techniques have been proposed for enabling privacy for person-level genome
sequences. For instance, SNPs from several genomic regions can be generalized into more general
concepts – e.g.; transition (change of A↔G or T↔C.), transversion (change of A↔C, A↔T, C↔G or
G↔T.), and exact SNP positions into approximate positions) [Lin et al., 2002]. This generalization
makes re-identification of an individual sequence difficult according to a prescribed level of protection.
In particular, k-anonymity can be used to generalize the genomic sequences such that a sequence
is indistinguishable from at least other k − 1 sequences. Also, the problem of SNP anonymization
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can be expanded to more complex variations of a genome using multiple sequence alignment and
clustering methods [Malin, 2005b; Li et al., 2012]. However, such methods are limited in that they
only work when there are a large number of sequences with relatively small number of variations.
Given the limitations of generalization-based strategies, it has been suggested that cryptographic
techniques might be more appropriate for maintaining data utility. In particular, it has been shown
that additive homomorphic encryption can be used to share encrypted data while still retaining the
ability to compute a limited set of queries (e.g., secure frequency count queries which are useful
to many analytical methods for genomic data) [Kantarcioglu et al., 2008]. Yet, this method leaks
information in that it reveals the positions of the SNPs, which in turn reveals the type of test being
conducted on the data. Moreover, privacy in this protocol comes at a high cost of computation.
Cryptographic hardware at the remote site can be used as a trusted computation base (TCB) to
design a framework in which all person-level biomedical data is stored at a central remote server in
encrypted form [Canim et al., 2012]. The server can compute over the genomic data from a large
number of people in a privacy-preserving fashion. This enables researchers to compute on shared
data without sharing person-level genomic data. This approach is efficient for typical biomedical
computations; however, it is limited in that trusted hardware tends to have relatively small memory
capacities, which dictate the need for load balancing mechanisms.
Sequence alignment. Sequence alignment is fundamental to genome sequencing. The increase in
the quantity of sequencing data is growing at a faster rate than the decreasing cost of computational
power, thus the delegation of read mapping to the cloud can be very beneficial. However, such
delegation can have major privacy implications. Chen et. al. [Chen et al., 2012] have shown that
read mapping can be delegated to the public cloud in a privacy preserving manner using a hybrid
cloud based approach. They exploit the fact that a sequence of a small number of nucleotides (≈20)
is unique and two sequences of equal length with edit distance of x, when divided into x+1 segments
will have at least one matching segment. Based on this fact, computation is divided into two parts:
(i) the public part is delegated to the public cloud, in which the public cloud finds exact matches
on encrypted data and returns a small number of matches to the private cloud, whereas (ii) the
private part takes place in a private cloud, which computes the edit distance using only the matches
returned by the public cloud. This approach reduces the local computation by a factor of 30 by
delegating 98% of the work to the public cloud.
VII.C Legal and Forensic
Paternity testing. Paternity testing determines whether a certain male individual is the father
of another individual. It is based on the high similarity between the genomes of a father and child
(99.9%) in comparison to two unrelated human beings (99.5%). It is not known exactly which 0.5%
of the human genome is different between two humans, but a properly chosen 1% sample of the
genome can determine paternity with high accuracy [Gibbs and Singleton, 2006]. Participants may
want to compute the test without sharing any information about their genomes.
Once genomes of both individuals are sequenced, a privacy-preserving paternity test can be car-
ried out using PSI-Cardinality (PSI-CA), where inputs to PSI-CA protocol are the sets of nucleotides
comprising the genome. The size of the human genome, or even 1% of it, cannot be handled by
current PSI and other SMC protocols. However, by exploiting domain knowledge, the computation
time can be reduced to 6.8ms and network bandwidth usage to 6.5KB by emulating the Restriction
Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) chemical test in software, which reduces the problem to
finding the intersection between two sets of size 25 [Baldi et al., 2011]. Subsequent work demon-
strates a framework for conducing such tests on a Android smartphone [Cristofaro et al., 2012].
Since the ideal output of the privacy-preserving paternity test should be yes or no, it cannot be
obtained using custom PSI protocols, whereas generic garbled circuit based protocols can be easily
modified to add this capability [Huang et al., 2011, 2012]. [He et al., 2014; Hormozdiari et al., 2014]
propose cryptographic protocols for identifying blood relatives.
Criminal forensics. Criminal forensic rules enable law enforcement agencies to have unlimited
access to the complete DNA record database of millions of individuals, usually of convicted criminals
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(e.g., CODIS12 in the US). The motivation behind creating such a database is to find a record that
matches the DNA evidence from a crime scene. Yet, providing unlimited access to law enforcement
agencies is unnecessary and may open the system to abuse. Cryptographic approaches have been
developed to preserve the privacy of the records that fail to match the evidence from the crime
scene [Bohannon et al., 2000]. Specifically, DNA records can be encrypted using a key that depends
upon certain tests, such that when DNA is collected from a crime scene, the scheme will only allow
decryption of the records that match the evidence.
Finally, partial homomorphic encryption can be used for privacy-preserving matching of Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA profiles in an honest-but-curious model [Bruekers et al., 2008]. Such
protocols (described in Section VII.D) are useful for identity, paternity, ancestry, and forensic tests.
VII.D Direct-to-consumer (DTC)
Many DTC companies provide genealogy and ancestry testing. Cryptographic schemes can be used
to conduct these tests in a privacy-preserving fashion. Partial homomorphic encryption can be
cleverly used on STR profiles of individuals to conduct (i) common ancestor testing based on the
Y chromosome, (ii) paternity test with one parent, (iii) paternity test with two parents, and (iv)
identity testing [Bruekers et al., 2008].
Despite the increasing use of DTC genome applications, less focus has been given to the security
and privacy of this domain. In particular, genomic data aggregation issues require special attention
because some companies allow people to publish high-density SNP profiles online in combination
with demographic and phenotypic data.
Focusing on kin genome privacy, [Humbert et al., 2014] build a protection mechanism against the
kinship attack [Humbert et al., 2013] that uses DTC genomic data from openSNP [Greshake et al.,
2014]. The main focus of the work is to find a balance between the utility and privacy of genomic
data. Every family member has a privacy constraint that he wants to protect. At the same time,
some family members want to publish (part of) their genomes mainly to facilitate genomic research.
The paper proposes a multi-dimensional optimization mechanism in which the privacy constraints
of the family members are protected and at the same time the utility (amount of genomic data
published by the family members) is maximized.
VIII Challenges for Genome Privacy
While the value of genome sequencing in routine care has yet to be fully demonstrated, it is an-
ticipated that the plummeting cost and commoditization of these analyses will change the practice
of medicine. Data confidentiality and individual privacy will be central to the acceptance and
widespread usage of genomic information by healthcare systems. However, a clear demonstration of
the clinical usefulness of genomics is first needed for doctors and other healthcare providers to fully
embrace genomics and privacy.
VIII.A Consumer-driven Genomics
An unprecedented aspect of contemporary genomics that comes with its own set of issues for data
confidentiality is democratization, including facilitated access to large-scale personal health-related
data. Whereas medical and genetic information used to be obtainable only through hospital or
research laboratories, people can now access their own genotyping or sequencing results through
direct-to-consumer companies such as 23andMe, as discussed before. On the research side, numerous
participant-centric initiatives have recently been launched (notably by citizens’ networks such as
openSNP [Greshake et al., 2014] and the Personal Genome Project). As a result, genomic data are
increasingly found outside the controlled cocoon of healthcare systems or research. In particular,
individual genetic results or aggregated datasets are available on the Internet, often with non-existent
12Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), The Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/
biometric-analysis/codis
20
or minimal protection. On one hand, these crowd-based initiatives are very exciting, because they
have the potential to stimulate biomedical research, accelerate discoveries and empower individuals.
Yet, on the other hand, they raise a number of concerns about potential privacy risks (as highlighted
in Section IX). For example, privacy risks must be assessed in the context of the extensive nature
of information available on the Internet (including online social networks), and not only within the
narrower confines of genomic research or clinical care delivery.
VIII.B Privacy and the Benefits of Genomic Data
It is important to note that both a lack and an excess of privacy have the potential to derail the
expected benefits of genomics in healthcare and research. On one hand, the efficient and secure
handling of individual genotype and sequence data will be central to the implementation of genomic
medicine. The Hippocratic Oath13 remains a pillar of medical deontology and one of the few stable
concepts in the highly tumultuous history of medical practice. The Hippocratic Oath contains a clear
statement about the patient’s privacy. Trust is at the core of any successful healthcare system: any
leakage of highly sensitive genomic information may raise concerns and opposition in the population
and among political decision makers. Earning and conserving trust is essential for hospitals and
private companies that deal with genomics. As a result, there is a potential for a service industry
securing genomic data, either by providing ad hoc solutions or by fully supporting storage and
delivery of raw/interpreted sequence information. Fortunately, as detailed in Section VII, there
exist a variety of tools that can mitigate the problem.
On the other hand, an excess of privacy-related hurdles could slow down research and interfere
with large-scale adoption of genomics in clinical practice. When designing privacy-preserving solu-
tions for genomic data, security and privacy researchers should keep in mind that most end-users
are not familiar with computer science and are almost exclusively interested in the clinical utility
of test results. Education is again a fundamental requirement for privacy protection. However, in
bioinformatics curricula, students are trained to maximize the information to be extracted from
(biological) data. Usually, such curricula do not address security and privacy concerns, because ad-
versarial scenarios are out of their scope. Conversely, computer scientists rarely have formal training
in biology, let alone genomics. But, they are trained in security, notably because of the formidable
challenge raised by the numerous vulnerabilities of the Internet. Consequently, to properly address
the concerns about genomic data protection, there is a clear and strong potential of cross-fertilization
between these two disciplines.
VIII.C Acceptable Utility vs. Privacy of Genomic Data
The balance between acceptable utility and privacy of genomic data needs to be considered in
context.
Healthcare. Patient-level information must be as precise as possible. Because genomic data
is used here to support clinical decision, including in life-threatening situations, any decrease in
data accuracy must be avoided. Security of electronic medical records and other health-related
information is therefore most often guaranteed through restricted access (e.g., intranet use, password
and card identification) to unmodified data. It is important to note, however, that genetic testing
is typically not urgent, and that privacy-preserving measures that would slightly delay a test result
could be tolerated.
Research. Research on complex trait genomics relies on large datasets on which genotyping or
sequencing association studies can be run. To gain statistical power and detect meaningful asso-
ciations, it is often necessary to merge many such studies through meta-analyses that can include
data from hundreds of thousands of individuals. Due to non-uniform use of technological platforms,
variation in time and place of genotyping, and differences in analysis pipelines, some degree of noise
13See http://guides.library.jhu.edu/content.php?pid=23699&sid=190964 for a modern version of the Hippocratic
Oath.
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is unavoidable. An interesting avenue for research is here to empirically determine whether differen-
tial privacy strategies (e.g., [Johnson and Shmatikov, 2013]) can be applied without compromising
discovery.
Legal and forensics. DNA collection and search for similarity pattern in genomic data are used
in criminal investigations and for other legal purposes such as paternity testing. The accuracy of
any test result is here again an absolute requirement to avoid legal prejudice. Extremely stringent
data protection must also be ensured due to the highly sensitive nature of such cases.
Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genomics. DTC companies providing individual genomic data have
a clear commercial incentive to protect customers’ privacy, in order to maintain trust and attract
new customers. For example, the 23andMe webpage states: “Your personalized web account provides
secure and easy access to your information, with multiple levels of encryption and security protocols
protecting your personal information.”. Of course, these measures are ineffective when individuals
choose to unveil their full identity online together with their genomic data, thereby putting their
(and their blood relatives) genome privacy at risk, either knowingly (as in the case of Personal
Genome Project participants) or out of naivety.
IX Framework for Privacy-Preserving handling of Genomic
data
In this section, we provide a general framework for security and privacy in the handling of genomic
data. The framework is illustrated in Figure 9. As has been done throughout this paper, we
divide the framework into four categories: (i) healthcare, (ii) research, (iii) legal and forensics, and
(iv) direct-to-consumer genomics. This classification is based on the most popular uses of genomic
data; however, we recognize that the boundaries between these categories are blurred and there is
significant overlap. For each of these we describe setting, threat model, and solutions and open
problems. The setting provides the most general environment around the problem (e.g., we do
not discuss the possibility of outsourcing the computation as one can easily extend our setting to
another one involving a third party). In this section, we assume that the adversary is computationally
bounded. We further assume that the adversary can leverage all publicly available information (e.g.,
data from the 1000 Genomes Project or public genealogy databases) to her advantage. Moreover,
in some cases, the adversary might have access to private data. For instance, people can abuse their
access to private data, an adversary can also steal the data, and data can be extracted from a lost
laptop.
IX.A Biospecimen
DNA is obtained in chemical form and then digitized. This cyber-physical nature of DNA creates
unique challenges for its protection.
IX.A.1 Threat Model
In our threat model, the adversary is capable of (i) obtaining DNA from an individual’s biological
cells either voluntarily (e.g., for research with informed consent) or involuntarily (e.g., leftover hairs
or saliva on a coffee cup), (ii) sequencing or genotyping the DNA from biospecimen, (iii) interpreting
the sequenced data to learn identity, disease, kinship, and any other sensitive information, and (iv)
linking the genomic data (or biospecimen) to the identity, health record, or any arbitrary background
information about the individual.
IX.A.2 Solutions and Open Problems
Legal protection is necessary to protect the biospecimen and the DNA (in its chemical form). How-
ever, a solution to this problem is a subject of public policy and is outside the scope of this paper.
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Figure 9: Genomic data handling framework: DNA is extracted from an individual’s tissue or cells. DNA
is digitized either using sequencing (to obtain Whole Genome Sequence (WGS) or Whole Exome Sequence
(WES)) or genotyping (to obtain variants, usually only SNPs). Reads obtained from sequencing are aligned
to form the complete genome, while genotyped variants are digitized from the microchip array directly. Read
data may be stored for later analysis. The aligned genome can be either stored in raw form or compressed
form (variations from a reference human genome). Medical tests and other types of computation shown in the
figure can be performed either on raw aligned genome or just on variants. Possible outputs of computation
are shown. Output depends on the type of computation and in some cases there is no output. The figure
shows the genomic data aggregation problem caused by recreational genomics services. The figure is divided
into three sections based on fundamental limitations of legal and technical measures for the protection
of genomic data. Legal protection is required for the left section, legal as well as technical protection is
required for the middle section, while, in theory, technical solutions would suffice for the protection of the
right section. The legend shows which blocks are associated with different uses of genomic data. We use the
word “patient” in this paper to mean someone whose genome is sequenced or genotyped and not necessarily
a person who is ill.
IX.B Digitization: Sequencing/Genotyping
IX.B.1 Setting
A biospecimen is obtained by an agency (e.g., hospital) and is sequenced or genotyped either by the
same agency or by an external agency (e.g., Illumina, 23andMe, etc.).
IX.B.2 Threat Model
Since a biospecimen is required for digitization, we assume the threat model discussed in Sec-
tion IX.A.1 with the following extensions: (i) the adversary has full control over the entire sequenc-
ing or genotyping infrastructure, (ii) the adversary can be honest-but-curious and can attempt to
learn partial or entire genomic data or any information derived from the genomic data, and (iii) the
adversary can be malicious and can compromise the integrity of partial or entire genomic data.
IX.B.3 Solutions and Open Problems
Given the cyber-physical nature of DNA, it is not possible to address this issue with technical
measures alone. Both legal and technical protections are required to protect against this threat. An
external agency cannot derive genomic data without a biospecimen, and legal protection is required
to prevent misuse. Sequencing machines are expensive and are manufactured by a limited number
of companies. We envision a well-regulated process for the manufacturing, procurement, and use
of sequencing machines and government regulations in place for it. The FDA already regulates the
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manufacturing of medical devices14 [Cheng, 2003]. Regular inspections would check for compliance.
Under such legal protections, sequencing machines could have tamper resistant trusted computing
base (TCB) that could output encrypted data such that the sequencing agency could not access the
plaintext genomic data.
IX.C Storage
We assume that once the adversary has access to the read data, it is easy to get raw aligned data
and variant data, hence we present storage of all three forms of data together.
IX.C.1 Setting
Genomic data can be stored by the (i) patient15, (ii) healthcare organization (e.g., as part of patient’s
EHR), or (iii) a third party.
IX.C.2 Threat Model
For all settings, we assume that the lifetime of genomic data is much longer than the lifetime of a
cryptographic algorithm. We consider the following threat models
Patient: Storage media or the device storing genomic data can be lost, stolen, or temporarily
accessed. A patient’s computer can be attacked by an adversary (curious or malicious) to compro-
mise confidentiality and/or integrity of the genomic data. We further assume that an adversary
can associate the identity and background information (including phenotype information) from any
arbitrary source. And, we assume that the adversary can use the compromised genomic data for
any arbitrary purpose.
Hospital: We consider all of the threats described for the patient and the following additional
threats. An insider (or hacker) has full access to the infrastructure and can link genomic information
to the phenotypic information in the patient’s health record.16 We also consider the threat of the
healthcare organization communicating incidental findings that are harmful – violating the right not
to know.17 We assume that the adversary can intentionally try to figure out variants of regions
of the genome from variants in other regions, e.g., to learn some sensitive SNPs that are removed
to prevent incidental finding issues. We also assume that a healthcare organization could illegally
collude with insurance agencies to facilitate discrimination based on genomic data.
Third party: We consider all of the threats discussed for the hospital and following additional
threat. The adversary, as the third party itself, can be interested in de-anonymizing the anonymized
genomic data or aggregate genomic data.
IX.C.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We report some solutions in Section VII. Users are generally not equipped with skills and equipment
to protect the security and privacy of their genomic data. For the storage of genomic data, an option
is to store it on a cloud in an encrypted fashion, which makes the adversary’s job harder, as now it
needs to circumvent cloud storage security measures and also require to hack into user’s computer
to steal the decryption key. Efficient encryption schemes allowing secure storage and computation
are required.
14http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/postmarketrequirements/
qualitysystemsregulations/
15We use the word patient to mean an individual whose genome is sequenced or genotyped and not necessarily a
person who is ill.
16We assume that data stored at the hospital is not anonymized.
17For instance, a doctor telling a patient his increased susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease, when he does not want
to know. We emphasize that defining what is harmful is an ethical issue and is out of scope of this study.
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IX.D Alignment/Assembly
As explained in Section VII, genomic data is obtained from the specimen in the form of short reads.
These short reads are then assembled using alignment or assembly algorithms. Alignment is done by
comparing the short reads to the reference genome, and is computationally very intensive. Hence,
it can be economically beneficial to delegate the alignment to the cloud.
IX.D.1 Setting
Short reads are obtained locally from the sequencing machine and alignment is delegated to an
untrusted third party.
IX.D.2 Threat Model
We assume that the third party can be honest-but-curious, as well as malicious, and can return
incorrect results for economic or other malicious motives.
IX.D.3 Solutions and open problems
We presented some solutions to this problem in Section VII [Chen et al., 2012]. However, there are
several problems with the most efficient solution to date. First, it is not provably secure. Second, its
security and efficiency requires that the read size be greater than 100 nucleotides. Third, this scheme
only works in a hybrid cloud environment and requires local computation. Given that our opinion
poll (described in Section V) shows that third party environments are of the greatest concern to
biomedical researchers, a provably secure and efficient solution that is capable of aligning the human
genome in a cloud computing environment is an important open research problem.
IX.E Interpretation
Interpretation depends upon two private inputs: the patient’s genomic data and an interpretation
algorithm (possibly from more than one party). Given the complexity of genomic data, it is unlikely
that any single party will have a complete interpretation algorithm. This makes the computation
a multiparty process between independent parties and the patient (or an agent of the patient,
e.g., a hospital). Although each party with a piece of the interpretation algorithm can compute
independently with the patient, collusion of any two parties may leak information about another
party’s inputs. Moreover, the interpretation of one party may depend upon the interpretation of
another party. We assume that all of these parties can be malicious and can collude to learn
information (e.g., the patient’s genomic data or another parties’ algorithm). In some cases, it
is necessary to sequence one’s parent to draw conclusions, in which case parents might also be
concerned about their privacy.
Personalized medicine is a special case of interpretation and depends upon the patient’s genomic
data and disease markers (possibly distributed among multiple parties).
Preconception testing is another special case of interpretation. It is different from personalized
medicine because it is a pre-pregnancy test and measures can be taken to conceive a healthy child (as
evident from www.counsyl.com success stories). Additionally, the outcome of the preconception test
almost always depends upon two people, each of whom might prefer to not disclose their genomic
status to the other.
IX.E.1 Setting
The computation is typically performed on private data from multiple parties. The parties involved
in the computation are those who input (i) their genomic data and (ii) interpretation algorithms.
The output of the computation should only be released to the patient or authorized physician
(possibly using the infrastructure of a healthcare organization).
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IX.E.2 Threat Model
We assume that all parties can be honest-but-curious, malicious, or colluding (and possibly all at
the same time). They can use arbitrary background knowledge to breach privacy. They may use
falsified genomic data or a falsified interpretation algorithm an arbitrary number of times to ascertain
another parties’ private inputs. Furthermore, they may influence the results in an arbitrary manner.
IX.E.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We discussed some of the solutions for the personalized medicine scenario in Section VII. However,
current solutions are limited to privacy-preserving disease susceptibility tests. It is clear that compu-
tational solutions that support a broad range of computation over genomic data are needed. At the
same time, the design of such systems must be practical and provide reasonable usability, accuracy,
security, and privacy.
IX.F Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS)
IX.F.1 Setting
The genomic data from two groups of people are collected, one being the case group (i.e., people
with the disease or some other trait) and the other being the control group (i.e., people without
the disease). Statistical analysis is then conducted to discover the correlation between the disease
and genetic variants. The results are subsequently published in research papers and posted online
possibly with restricted access (e.g., at dbGaP18).
IX.F.2 Threat Model
An adversary may wish to determine if the victim is a GWAS participant or blood relative of a
GWAS participant. We assume that the adversary has access to the high density SNP profile of the
victim and also to a reference population (which can be obtained from the same GWAS conducted
on a different population). The attack succeeds if the adversary learns information from the data
produced by GWAS, which she otherwise would not have learned.
IX.F.3 Solutions and Open Problems
There are various solutions that could be applied in this setting. We explained noise-based solutions,
such as differential privacy, in Section VII.B. Yet, differential privacy-based solutions make data more
noisy, which make adoption of these approaches difficult. This is particularly problematic because
biomedical researchers and physicians want more (not less) accurate data than is available today.
An ideal solution should preserve the utility of data while preserving the privacy of participants. We
believe that more research is required in this area to determine if noise-based approaches can lead
to more usable and pragmatic data publications. These approaches may, for instance, build upon
well-established sets of practices from other communities. For example, the Federal Committee on
Statistical Methodology (FCSM) has a long history of sharing information in a privacy-preserving
manner. These practices obey multi-level access principles and, to the best of the authors’ knowledge,
no significant privacy breach from such domain has been reported.
While the data disclosed by federal agencies is quite different from high-dimensional genomic
data, it might be possible to adapt these practices to balance the benefits and harms caused by
public sharing of aggregate genomic data. These strategies may be composed of social and technical
protections. From a social perspective, a popular method to mitigate risk is through contractual
agreements which prohibit the misuse of such data. Such contracts could be complemented by
cryptographic protocols that help preserve the privacy of the participants, particularly in settings in
which the data is used in the secure computation and only the output of the computation is revealed
to a specific party.
18http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap
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IX.G Data sharing
The majority of genome-phenome discoveries come from very large populations, sometimes on the
order of millions of participants. Given the costs and scarcity of such resources, sharing data would
fuel biomedical research. However, sharing this data entails privacy implications as discussed earlier.
It should be noted that individual-level genomic data from a large number of people is needed
to conduct genome-phenome studies (e.g., GWAS). Moreover, the results of a typical GWAS are
published as aggregate genomic data, which is usually made available to researchers at large (e.g.,
NIH requires results of all NIH-sponsored GWASs to be uploaded to dbGaP and published in research
papers — e.g., p-values of relevant SNPs). Therefore, we only focus on the sharing of individual
level genomic data here.
IX.G.1 Setting
Genomic data needs to be shared among different research institutions, possibly under different ju-
risdictions. Privacy-preserving solutions can be built in the following settings: (i) all data delegated
to and computation done on a trusted party (e.g., a governmental entity), (ii) all data delegated to
and computation done on an untrusted party, (iii) all data stored at and computation done at the
collection agency, (iv) sharing data using data use agreements, and (v) sharing anonymized data.
IX.G.2 Threat Model
We assume that data is being shared between untrusted parties. The parties with whom data
is being shared may want to use it for any arbitrary purpose, including using it for participant
re-identification, or for finding disease susceptibility of the patients or their blood relatives.
IX.G.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We described some solutions in Section VII.B. However, these solutions do not allow for arbitrary
computations on encrypted data. Theoretically, many cryptographic solutions exist to solve this
issue. For example, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can be used to encrypt the data and
arbitrary computations can be done on it while preserving privacy, but data needs to be decrypted
by the party that encrypted the data. Functional encryption (FE) could also be used, which allows
computation on encrypted data and produces plaintext directly. However, FHE and FE are not
sufficiently efficient to be practically useful. The performance of FHE and FE is progressing and
these schemes might be usable in the future to support data sharing. Clearly though, specialized
efficient solutions for genomic data exploiting nature of genomic data are needed to support specific
analytics. Controlled Functional Encryption (C-FE) [Naveed et al., 2014] described above is a
promising approach to develop practical solutions.
IX.H Paternity
Genomic data is extensively used to determine parentage and test results are admissible in courts of
law. Today, the biospecimen of the individuals involved in the tests are outsourced to a third party
in the form of cheek swabs, where the DNA is extracted. Sending one’s DNA to a third party could
have serious implications for one’s privacy.
IX.H.1 Setting
Two parties each have their sequenced genome or genotyped variants and one party wants to know
whether the other party is the parent.
IX.H.2 Threat Model
The threat model in this case is the standard model defined for secure two-party computations. We
assume that parties can be honest-but-curious or malicious.
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IX.H.3 Solutions and Open Problems
In Section VII, we explain some of the solutions to the problem. A chemical test – RFLP – can
be simulated for a neat and efficient privacy-preserving solution, given that genomes are stored by
individuals themselves [Baldi et al., 2011]. Yao’s garbled circuits can be used instead of PSI to
output a binary answer (YES or NO) instead of the number of matched segments in simulated
RFLP test and therefore reveals the minimum amount of information.
IX.I Forensic DNA Databases
Many countries maintain a huge database of DNA profiles of convicted (and, in some cases, accused)
criminals. Law enforcement agencies usually have unlimited access to such a resource, which makes
it vulnerable to abuse. It is possible that in the near future, instead of concise DNA profiles, law
enforcement agencies will be able to have access to full genome sequences of individuals, which
further exacerbates the issues.
IX.I.1 Setting
Police officers collect DNA samples from a crime scene. Then, they want to check whether an
individual with the same DNA profile/sequence is present in the DNA records database.
IX.I.2 Threat Model
We assume that the adversary can be honest-but-curious, interested in learning about other people
in the database. In addition, the adversary can be malicious. If the adversary has write access to
the database, he can also try to compromise the integrity of the record(s) in the database. We also
assume that the adversary is able to affect the outcome of a query in an arbitrary manner.
IX.I.3 Solutions and Open Problems
We discussed some of the existing solutions to this problem in Section VII. Theoretically, this
problem differs from interpretation and other types of computation, as the privacy for query is not
required, only the privacy of the individuals other than the suspect is of concern here. This makes
the problem more tractable, possibly making solutions scalable to large databases with millions of
records.
IX.J Recreational Genomics
Several commercial companies offer direct-to-consumer genomics services. They include kinship,
ancestry, and partner compatibility testing.
IX.J.1 Setting
The customer ships her specimen (usually saliva) to a company. This specimen is used to genotype
typically one million SNPs and the data is then digitized and stored in digital form on the server.
Some computation is done on this data for ancestry, disease susceptibility, kinship, or other tests.
The data and the results are then available for the user to download or see through a browser. Some
companies (e.g., 23andme) allow to search for people with common ancestors e.g., 3rd, 4th or 5th
cousins.
IX.J.2 Threat Model
We assume the threat models for specimen collection, digitization and interpretation. There are
also new threats. The owner of the data posts his data online along with his identity and some
phenotypical data, as done for example on openSNP [Greshake et al., 2014]. We assume that the
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data owner makes an informed decision, so he willingly gives away his genome privacy. The major
threat then is to the blood relatives of the data owner, whose private information is also leaked.
Genomic data aggregation is another issue caused by users posting their genomic data online.
This data can be aggregated by companies and then used for commercial or other purposes. It
is worth noting that some genome-sharing websites have achievement programs where users get
rewards whenever they post their phenotype data (e.g., hair color, eye color, disease pre-disposition,
etc.). Genomic data along with phenotypic data is much more valuable than genomic data alone.
IX.J.3 Solutions and Open Problems
All other solutions apply here, however recreational genomics presents new problems of public sharing
and genomic data aggregation. We emphasize that public awareness is required to enable people to
make an informed decision to share their genomic data publicly because such sharing compromises
their own and their relatives’ privacy. It should be made clear that in case of abuse of this publicly
available data, people would be discouraged to share genomic data even for legitimate research
purposes. However, this is a policy and ethics debate and is out of scope of this paper.
Conclusion
The confluence of cheap computing and high-throughput sequencing technologies is making genomic
data increasingly easy to collect, store, and process. At the same time, genomic data is being in-
tegrated into a wide range of applications in diverse settings (e.g., healthcare, research, forensics,
direct-to-consumer), such that privacy and security issues have yet to be sufficiently defined and
addressed. For instance, massive computation capability is needed to analyze genomic data for re-
search purposes, such that the cloud is likely to play a large role in the management of such data.
At the same time, genomic data will be used in specific applications (e.g., forensics) where mobile
computing environments (e.g., tablets and smartphones) will be routinely used to access those data.
And, genomic data will be increasingly available on the Web, especially in citizen-contributed envi-
ronments, (e.g., online social networks). While some individuals are sharing such information, there
are significant privacy concerns because it is unknown what such information is capable of revealing,
or how it will be used in the future.
As such, there is a clear need to support personalized medicine, genomic research, forensic in-
vestigation, and recreational genomics while respecting privacy. Computing is a crucial enabler, but
can also be the first source of leakage if appropriate mechanisms are not put in place. Our survey
(opinion poll from the biomedical community) provides some insight into what may be the most
important aspects of the problem to study. And, along these lines, we have provided a review of the
state-of-the-art regarding computational protection methods in this field, as well as the main chal-
lenges moving forward. To assist the data privacy and security community to develop meaningful
solutions, we have provided a framework to facilitate the understanding of the privacy-preserving
handling of genomic data.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we provide additional results from our expert opinion poll discussed in Section V.
Results shown here are stratified according to the security/privacy and genetics/genomics expertise
of the participants. Results for the cases where the number of participants was small are omitted.
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Figure 10: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes
are described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the probes:
Only “Expert” biomedical participants (sample size 23).
37
18%
50%
0% 7%
14% 7% 7%
18% 14%
0%
50%
100%
Pr
ob
e 
1
Pr
ob
e 
2
Pr
ob
e 
3
Pr
ob
e 
4
Pr
ob
e 
5
Pr
ob
e 
6
Pr
ob
e 
7
Pr
ob
e 
8
No
ne
Figure 11: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes
are described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the probes:
Only “Knowledgeable” biomedical participants (sample size 28).
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Figure 12: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes
are described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the probes:
Only “Some familiarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
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Figure 13: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes
are described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the probes:
Only “Knowledgeable” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 14: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes
are described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the probes:
Only “Some familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 15: Response to the question: Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked). The probes
are described in detail in Figure 2. “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the probes:
Only “No familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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Figure 16: Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community: Only “Ex-
pert” biomedical participants (sample size 23).
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Figure 17: Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community: Only “Knowl-
edgeable” biomedical participants (sample size 28).
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Figure 18: Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community: Only “Some
familiarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
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Figure 19: Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community: Only “Knowl-
edgeable” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 20: Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community: Only “Some
familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 21: Relevance of genome privacy research done by the computer science community: Only “No
familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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Figure 22: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? : Only “Expert”
biomedical participants (sample size 23).
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Figure 23: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? : Only “Knowl-
edgeable” biomedical participants (sample size 28).
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Figure 24: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? : Only “Some
familiarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
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Figure 25: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? : Only “Knowl-
edgeable” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 26: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? : Only “Some
familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 27: Response to the question: Would you publicly share your genome on the Web? : Only “No
familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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Figure 28: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? : Only
“Expert” biomedical participants (sample size 23).
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Figure 29: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? : Only
“Knowledgeable” biomedical participants (sample size 28).
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Figure 30: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? : Only
“Some familiarity” biomedical participants (sample size 13).
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Figure 31: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? : Only
“Knowledgeable” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 32: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? : Only
“Some familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 24).
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Figure 33: Response to the question: Assuming that one’s genomic data leaks a lot of private information
about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data? : Only
“No familiarity” security and privacy participants (sample size 11).
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